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Development based on 
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Modern oil drilling started in Bibi-Aybat outside Baku, then part 
of the Russian Empire, in 1846, a decade before extraction 
began in Pennsylvania in the United States. More than a 
century and a half later, Baku has once again been at the 
centre of an oil boom underpinning Azerbaijan’s astonishing 
average economic growth rate of over 20 per cent annually in 
real terms in 2005-08. While most countries in the transition 
region experienced strong growth until 2008 (see Chapter 2), 
the performance of major oil and gas producers – Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan – stands out (see  
Chart 4.1). The performance differential is even more striking  
if growth is measured in US dollars rather than real terms  
(see Chart 4.2). By this measure Russian GDP grew almost  
six-fold over the period 1999-2008, compared with the real 
GDP growth of 93 per cent, and Azerbaijan’s growth was  
faster still.
Reaping the rewards and managing the problems of natural 
resource wealth have been the defining characteristics  
of the development experience of commodity-rich countries, 
particularly in the last decade. On the upside, commodity 
revenues have put enormous fiscal resources at the disposal 
of governments and fuelled an unparalleled economic boom. 
On the downside, commodity exports and commodity-related 
foreign direct investment (FDI) have led to large foreign 
exchange inflows that have complicated macroeconomic 
management and made countries vulnerable to sudden swings 
in commodity prices. Partly as a consequence of the collapse 
of oil prices in the summer of 2008, growth in Azerbaijan 
declined dramatically from 16.5 per cent in the first half of 
2008 to 3.6 per cent in the first half of 2009. In Russia the 
decline was even greater, from 8 per cent growth in the first 
half of 2008 to -10.4 per cent in the first half of 2009.
Even more challenging than managing short-run volatility 
is the problem of maintaining high growth rates in the long 
term. Past experiences of resource-rich economies worldwide 
tell a cautionary tale in this respect. Over the long term, 
resource-rich countries tend to underperform compared to 
their resource-poor peers with the same initial level of per 
capita income (see Chart 4.3). This observation gave rise to 
the concept of a “resource curse”, meaning that resource 
abundance may undermine rather than foster economic 
development over a longer period of time.1 
This chapter looks at the policy problems faced by major 
commodity exporters in the EBRD region, focusing on 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia, which enjoy relatively  
high oil revenues (see Chart 4.4), and also Turkmenistan, the 
world’s sixth largest natural gas exporter. The analysis is also 
applicable to some degree to two other transition countries 
which exhibit a high share of non-fuel commodity exports – 
in Mongolia copper receipts accounted for over 50 per cent  
of merchandise exports in 2007, while in the Kyrgyz Republic 
gold, mercury and other metals accounted for approximately 
half of exports. 
This chapter interprets some of the key policies and reforms 
undertaken in commodity-exporting countries over the last 
decade – particularly Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia –  
in terms of a development strategy based on:
–  commodity exports and investment in further natural 
resource production
–  the creation of macroeconomic buffers in the form of 
sovereign wealth funds, to allow countercyclical fiscal policy 
and mitigate upward pressures on the real exchange rate
–  diversification based in part on public investment and 
state-led industrial policy, and also on financial development 
to direct natural resource income to productive uses outside 
the natural resource sector. 
The question is to what extent this “model” has been 
successful in laying the basis for sustainable long-term growth 
and avoiding the short and long-term problems associated with 
commodity exports. 
In the light of the previous chapter’s emphasis on policies to 
manage foreign exchange inflows – a problem that carries over 
to the resource-rich economies, as do some of the solutions – 
most of the following analysis will focus on issues unique  
to the commodity-led development model, particularly the 
channels through which natural resource wealth can undermine 
long-term growth and the policies that can help avoid this 
outcome. The chapter then provides evidence on the actual 
policies of the resource-rich transition countries in recent years 
and assesses the success of such policies, particularly with 
regard to diversification. 
Chart 4.1
Cumulative real GDP growth, 1999-2008
■ Transition countries   ■ Fitted line
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), EBRD and authors’ calculations.
Note: Fitted line is based on the OLS regression of growth on logarithm of GDP per capita at purchasing 
power parity (PPP). 
■ Transition countries   ■ Fitted line
Sources: IMF, EBRD and authors’ calculations. 
Note: Fitted line is based on the OLS regression of growth on logarithm of GDP per capita.  
Data for Turkmenistan are from 2007. Data for Montenegro were not available. 
Chart 4.2
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Economic growth in resource-rich countries 
How does natural resource abundance affect long-term 
economic growth and development? Economics has 
traditionally viewed growth as determined by the rate of capital 
accumulation, labour force growth and technological progress. 
Natural resource wealth can spur growth by financing capital 
accumulation and creating incentives for private investment, 
particularly in the natural resources sector. In addition, 
commodity resources can help developing countries escape 
from an “underdevelopment trap”. If there are fixed costs of 
investing in a new technology, and investment in one sector 
influences demand for another sector’s products, an economy 
may be stuck in a state of chronic low investment and low 
growth.2 Commodity resources could give the economy the 
impetus that it needs to finance a coordinated investment 
effort and break out of the trap. 
However, the presence of commodity resources may also 
create disincentives to investment in ways that could offset  
the beneficial effects on long-term growth. These disincentives 
create the potential resource curse. They fall into two 
categories: disincentives for physical and human capital 
accumulation (particularly in the non-resource sectors) and 
disincentives for improving political and economic institutions. 
Macroeconomic volatility and the “Dutch Disease” 
Commodity dependence is an obvious source of 
macroeconomic volatility, with explosive booms when 
commodity prices are high and excruciating busts when they 
collapse (see Chart 4.5 setting the volatile oil price against the 
very low terms of trade volatility of a large diversified country – 
the United States). This need not be a big problem if these 
risks can be insured via the financial system (for example, by 
making debt payments contingent on oil prices). When financial 
markets are not developed, however, investors may find it hard 
to fully hedge. As a result, terms of trade volatility could have  
a negative effect on growth, as economic agents may find it 
too risky to undertake irreversible investments in projects that 
may turn out unprofitable in an economic downturn.3 
Human capital accumulation particularly can suffer as a result 
of this problem. Investments in education are long-term and 
irreversible, and will therefore be rationally scaled down in a 
volatile environment in which demand for qualified labour is 
more uncertain. There is evidence that this mechanism is 
indeed at work in resource-rich countries.4 As education cycles 
stretch over years and sometimes decades, underinvestment  
in this area may be even more difficult to reverse than 
underinvestment in physical capital.
A related problem is the “Dutch Disease”, which refers to the 
idea that natural resource exports may come at the expense of 
the manufacturing sector.5 Investment and consumption related 
to commodity revenues raise the cost of labour and the relative 
prices of non-tradeable goods (services). Labour and capital 
inputs shift towards the booming resource sector, services and 
residential construction, while inhibiting the development of 
manufacturing.6 If manufacturing production is more responsive 
to “learning by doing”, product quality improvements and  
the discovery of new products, this could depress long-term 
growth.7 Growth could also suffer because commodity rents 
are distributed less equally than manufacturing revenues, 
which may weaken constituencies for institutional reform  
(see next section).
Chart 4.4
Value of produced oil, 2006 
■ Value of produced oil in US$ per capita (left axis) 
■ Value of produced oil in per cent of GDP (right axis) 
Sources: EIA, IMF and authors’ calculations. 
Note: Oil is valued at international prices. 
■ Brent Crude oil price (period average = 100)   ■ US terms of trade (2008 = 100)
Sources: Bloomberg, IMF and EBRD calculations.
Note: Based on oil price in US$ per barrel of Brent Crude, in 2008 prices, adjusted using  
US consumer price index.
Chart 4.5
Oil price in real terms  
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■ Major oil producers   ■ Other countries   ■ Non-oil sample trend line   ■ Oil sample trend line
Sources: IMF, Energy Information Administration (EIA) and EBRD calculations.
Note: Trend lines are fitted based on regressions for a broad sample of 138 countries. Major oil 
producers are defined as countries where oil production valued at international prices exceeded  
10 per cent of GDP in 1980.
Chart 4.3
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In addition, the Dutch Disease may exacerbate the problem  
of macroeconomic volatility. If there are dynamic economies  
of scale in the manufacturing sector (from learning by doing), 
manufacturing will suffer when resource prices increase. 
However, when resource prices fall, there is no symmetric 
boost; there has been a period of low manufacturing output, 
and productivity in this sector has fallen behind its foreign 
peers, so manufacturing has become non-competitive. As 
a result, nominal exchange depreciation may depress the 
domestic economy to a much greater extent than would 
otherwise have happened (a prospect that will discourage 
investment). Countries that switch from manufacturing to oil 
exports during a resource boom may lose their technological 
edge and then struggle to recover after the boom ends.8 
Institutions and inequality
Political and economic institutions are vital to economic 
development. In a weak institutional environment, with a lack 
of protection for property rights, investors fear expropriation by 
the state and will underinvest. In an environment with strong 
institutions, where laws governing financial markets reflect best 
practice, courts are independent and the police enforce the law 
equitably, private returns to investment are higher. Institutions 
therefore provide incentives for investment and innovation 
which are critical to long-term growth. 
To understand the effect of resource rents (revenues net  
of extraction costs) on institutions, one needs to analyse  
the incentives of those individuals who may be in a position  
to shape institutional development. Politicians or other  
policy-makers who are able to influence institutions may 
genuinely care about economic growth and development,  
but at the same time may also be concerned about their own  
rents. While strong institutions promote growth, they do so  
by constraining politicians’ ability to extract those rents. For 
example, if courts and regulatory bodies are independent from 
political authorities, this limits the ability of those authorities  
to use these institutions to further their private interests. 
Natural resources provide revenues that politicians can 
potentially extract – but only if institutions allow them to do  
so. Higher resource revenues will therefore increase the 
preference of politicians for weak institutions.9 
Whether this preference can be realised may depend critically 
on the initial quality of political and economic institutions. In 
countries with strong institutions, politicians’ ability to extract 
rents will be low to begin with – hence they will prefer to 
promote economic growth, including through sustaining those 
institutions. In countries with weak initial institutions, attempts 
to extract rents are likely to be more successful. In such 
countries, resource abundance slows down or even reverses 
the development of institutions, which in turn slows economic 
growth. This results in an “institutional trap” in resource-rich 
countries, meaning a vicious circle of underdeveloped 
institutions and a lack of incentive to improve them.
This vicious circle may be exacerbated by high income 
inequality, which typically accompanies natural resource  
wealth (see Chart 4.6 for the Gini coefficients – a statistical 
measure of inequality – of selected commodity exporters).10 
High inequality can be harmful for growth for several reasons.  
In an unequal society with imperfect capital markets, many 
talented people will have no access to capital or education, 
resulting in individual poverty traps. High inequality may also 
bias government policies towards redistribution policies that 
hurt growth, as the relatively poor median voter would prefer  
to have more redistribution.11 
Inequality and resource wealth may interact in nefarious ways. 
When resource rents are large, it is easier to buy off the median 
voter without achieving real redistribution or implementing 
development-friendly policies. (This logic applies regardless 
of the presence of elections, as most modern dictators are 
arguably in even greater need of popular consent.) Conversely, 
when total rents are appropriated by fewer individuals,  
rent-seeking (and weak institutions that make rent-seeking 
possible) become even more attractive to the members of the 
elite. In this way, weak institutions and high inequality can feed 
off each other in an economy with large natural resources. 
Empirical evidence on resource curse or resource blessing
Is there a resource curse or a resource blessing? While the 
empirical debate is far from settled, there is an emerging 
consensus based on a number of cross-country growth 
studies12 that resource-rich countries perform less successfully 
than resource-poor ones. Furthermore, the literature has found 
that the effect of resource abundance does indeed depend (as 
discussed above) on the initial quality of political and economic 
institutions.13 If this is low, resource abundance slows down 
or even reverses the development of institutions, which in turn 
slows down economic growth. In contrast, in countries with 
developed institutions, resource abundance does not seem  
to have a consequent negative effect on growth. In particular,  
a number of studies found no evidence of Dutch Disease in 
Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, or in Russia 
until 2006.14
There is extensive literature on the interaction between 
resource rents and institutions. Oil revenues have been  
shown to have adverse effects on property rights, corporate 
governance, media freedom, institutions of democracy,  
and reforms that improve the operating environment for 
medium-sized businesses in non-resource sectors.15 In 
unstable societies resource revenues may substantially 
undermine social cohesion, increasing the likelihood of civil 
unrest and armed conflict.16 As those institutions listed 
above have a positive effect on long-term growth, the 
negative impact of resource wealth suggests an explanation  
of the resource curse phenomenon.
The empirical debate is far from complete. Many of the  
cross-country results are not robust in respect of the sample 
countries and time period. Moreover, cross-country growth 
regressions suffer from well-known methodological problems.17 
Recent studies on the effect of resource abundance on 
institutions use techniques that avoid these problems, but  
do not focus on the causal effect of resource abundance on 
growth and development.
Chart 4.6
Gini coefficients of selected commodity exporters  
■ Commodity exporters   ■ Other countries   
■ Commodity exporter sample trend line   ■ Other countries trend line
Sources: World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University, IMF, 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and EBRD calculations.
Note: Higher values of Gini coefficients correspond to higher income inequality. Trend lines are fitted 
based on regressions for a broad sample of countries, where Gini coefficients are available for  
2002–06, taking the latest observation available. Commodity exporters are defined as countries where 
mining and fuel exports accounted for more than half of total merchandise exports. 
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Box 4.1
The optimal rate of resource extraction
Should countries front-load resource extraction as much 
as technically feasible or should they try to spread extraction 
over a long period? On the one hand, immediately extracting 
as much resource as possible could help avoid an  
under-development trap by financing a “big push”. On the 
other hand, it might be rational to save non-renewable 
resources for future generations when they could be extracted 
using more efficient technologies. In addition, the rate of 
resource extraction could affect international commodity 
prices. Governments of oil-rich countries could seek to slow 
down oil extraction to raise the world oil price and maximise 
revenue. However, this may be risky if high oil prices 
encourage investment in alternative technologies that over 
time challenge the dominance of oil. 
Assuming that no single producer enjoys enough market 
power to “play” the market and that resource demand is 
constant over time, the present value-maximising extraction 
path is one that keeps the resource price (net of unit 
extraction costs) increasing at the rate of interest (and thus 
the present value of a unit extracted remains unchanged over 
time).18 This implies that output will decline monotonically. 
A critical assumption is obviously the profile of demand. If 
demand is assumed to rise – for example, because of world 
economic growth – it may well be optimal to have a rising 
extraction path. If demand is expected to fall – say, because 
of alternative technologies – more front-loading extraction 
could be the best option.
 
 
 
Models based on the level of proven reserves in the oil-rich 
countries and assumptions about future demand, future 
technologies and extraction costs suggest that, on balance, 
hydrocarbon-rich transition countries undertake too little – 
rather than too much – extraction at present, and should 
invest more in future extraction capacity.19 These countries 
possess substantial oil and gas reserves (equivalent to more 
than 50 years of production) implying that the risk of unjustly 
expropriating the wealth of future generations is low.  
That said, the models typically do not take into account 
institutional development. If institutions are expected to 
improve over time, there could be a case for back-loading 
extraction, as future revenues would then be used with higher 
social returns and the negative effects of resource rents  
on institutions would be reduced.
In practice, increasing investment in long-term extraction 
capacity is difficult, even during times of high oil prices, due 
to high investor uncertainty. In addition, a project that is too 
risky for private investors should arguably also be considered 
too risky for the state, although in some cases governments 
may use additional tax incentives to attract private investors 
to long-term projects. 
Policy goals and tools
Resource-rich economies face a number of difficult policy 
problems. These include problems with respect to the natural 
resource sector itself – in particular, how fast to develop  
the sector and whether to front-load extraction as much 
as possible or delay it over time (see Box 4.1). Beyond this 
question, the main challenge is to develop policies that will 
allow the economy to benefit from resource revenues while 
mitigating the associated resource curse. The arguments made 
in the previous section suggest that such policies should 
include: economic diversification; reducing macroeconomic 
volatility; financial development; and reducing inequality. 
–  Diversification addresses the root cause of the resource 
curse – the bias generated by resource rents. By doing  
so, it creates an environment that is more conducive to 
productive investment and to better institutions. In a sense, 
diversification acts like a commitment device; even if it is 
costly in the short term (by channelling public investment 
away from the resource sector, for example), it increases 
investment and growth in the long term. At the same time,  
it makes a resource-rich economy less vulnerable to 
external shocks and therefore less volatile.
–  Policies that reduce volatility lower risk in the economy 
and so weaken one of the links through which commodity 
dependence can depress investment and long-term growth. 
The reduction of risk is also desirable in itself. 
–  Promoting financial development acts as a horizontal 
diversification policy, as it provides disproportionate support 
to financially dependent industries in non-resource sectors.
–  In addition to its direct benefits for growth (particularly by 
allowing a wider group to access investment and education 
opportunities), reducing inequality can weaken an important 
incentive that stands in the way of institutional development 
in resource-rich countries – namely rent-seeking that is 
relatively more attractive if its fruits do not have to be 
shared widely. 
The remainder of this section briefly discusses the policy tools 
that can be employed to advance these objectives.
Vertical versus horizontal diversification policies
Diversification is often pursued through vertical industrial 
policies. These involve “picking winners”, through preferential 
treatment of specific non-resource industries (for example, 
particular manufacturing activities). This may take the form  
of lower taxes, subsidies, protection from foreign competitors, 
or direct government investment. 
The alternative horizontal approach provides incentives for 
diversification without targeting specific sectors, by raising 
private returns to investment in physical and human capital 
across the board. Policies include improvements in property 
rights protection, contract enforcement and financial regulation, 
as well as investment in education and infrastructure and 
broad support for financial development. 
Chapter 5 of the 2008 Transition Report surveys the experience 
with vertical and horizontal industrial policies and argues that 
the former have rarely been successful, particularly in weak 
institutional environments. This is because they give discretion 
to government officials who may not have the technical 
capacity or the incentives to use it well and also provide 
additional opportunities for rent-seeking. For this reason, 
vertical diversification policies are not advisable for most 
resource-rich emerging market countries. 
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At the same time, many aspects of horizontal policies will  
also be hard to implement for a government operating in a 
resource-rich environment with weak institutions. Indeed, 
better contract enforcement or better regulatory institutions,  
for example, constitute the ultimate aim of diversification  
(as this is supposed to lead to better incentives for institutional 
reform). For many resource-rich emerging market governments, 
diversification policies will therefore need to concentrate  
on public investment, and particularly investments in 
infrastructure and education, which may be feasible  
even with weaker institutions.
Macroeconomic policies and sovereign wealth funds
In the late 1970s many major oil exporters ran budget  
deficits, borrowing against future revenues and paving the  
way to a disaster when oil prices eventually dropped. In  
the early 21st century most governments have pursued 
macroeconomic policies that took these lessons into 
account. Most governments extensively taxed resource 
revenues, paid off sovereign debt (ahead of schedule in  
many cases) and accumulated international reserves  
or other foreign assets. 
Building up reserves and externally held sovereign wealth 
serves multiple purposes (see also sovereign wealth fund 
section on page 84). In the short term it reduces pressures  
for real appreciation and preserves competitiveness of the 
domestic sector. In addition, state wealth funds enable 
governments to diversify risk away from commodity risk or 
domestic shocks, to smooth budget expenditures over time  
and to build a reserve that can support a fiscal stimulus in  
a downturn. As a result, they help reduce macroeconomic 
volatility and improve the investment climate.20 
Aside from stabilising the economy, state wealth funds can 
also support diversification by limiting rent-seeking. By 
channelling resources to pre-defined and transparent uses – 
for example, spending in a downturn, specific forms of public 
investment or saving funds for future generations – sovereign 
wealth funds make it more difficult to divert resource rents for 
private gain. This, in turn, can begin to change the incentives  
of economic and political elites in the direction of policies and 
institutions that support growth. Whether wealth funds are 
successful in this respect will depend on whether they are 
strong enough to resist “raiding” for extraneous purposes,  
and also on the transparency of the spending that they are 
meant to finance.
Financial development
Financial development can support diversification in  
resource-rich economies through several channels. First, 
as already discussed, it mitigates the effect of resource  
price volatility and so increases incentives to invest.  
Second, functioning financial markets should, in principle, 
disproportionately benefit investors in non-resource industries 
as those industries are more dependent on external finance 
than the resource sector.21 Lastly, a developed financial system 
reduces inequality by giving more people access to credit and 
so to opportunities to invest, including in their own education. 
Financial development policies are well-known and include 
improved regulation of banks and security markets, the 
introduction of deposit insurance and credit history bureaux 
and the establishment of effective court systems. However,  
the fundamental problem is that it may be particularly difficult 
to undertake such reforms in weak institutional environments  
that need them the most. Nonetheless, most emerging  
market countries have taken initial steps in this regard.
Reducing inequality
Redistributing resource rents to the broader public reduces  
the ruling elite’s interest in rent-seeking and therefore 
promotes development of institutions. In developed countries, 
such redistribution can be carried out directly through 
progressive taxation. In developing countries with weak 
government, progressive taxation does not work as the rich  
can avoid paying taxes. Most redistribution policies in these 
circumstances take the form of public projects financed by the 
resource rents accumulated by governments or free provision 
of public goods, such as education and health care, which 
disproportionately benefit the poor.
Ideally, policies aimed at combating inequality should include 
improving financial institutions, reforming education systems 
and facilitating labour mobility. In practice, resources are often 
channelled to existing inefficient structures rather than to 
emerging or reforming ones.
Diversification policies in resource-rich countries
International experience suggests that economic diversification 
away from oil and gas is a very challenging task. As discussed 
in Chapter 4 of the 2008 Transition Report, the oil sector 
is poorly “connected” to other exports in terms of the  
required production capabilities and inputs.22 This implies 
that launching the production and exports of new goods  
may require substantial investment in capacity building and 
technological transfer. In contrast, products in higher-value-
added manufacturing (for instance, in the automotive or 
electronics sectors) tend to be relatively well connected to 
other potential exports, making it easier to diversify further. 
Nonetheless, a number of oil-rich countries have managed 
to achieve a substantial degree of diversification: copper-rich 
Chile developed competitive agriculture and fishing industries, 
including salmon farming and wine production; Malaysia  
built up technologically advanced manufacturing industries 
integrated into the Asian and global production chains; 
Indonesia developed a medium-to-high technology 
manufacturing base while significantly improving the 
international competitiveness of its agricultural sector;  
and Mexico established a high-tech manufacturing sector 
based primarily on FDI from US firms.
Overall, the international experience backs the view that 
resource-rich countries can promote economic diversification 
by: investing in human capital and infrastructure; developing 
financial institutions with a view to effectively intermediating 
commodity-related and other financial inflows throughout the 
economy; and building stabilisation or sovereign wealth funds. 
Hydrocarbon-rich transition countries have embraced all these 
policies to varying degrees. 
Public investment 
Diversification away from excessive dependence on oil and gas 
is a cornerstone of Russia’s long-term development concept 
and underpins the establishment of the Russian Venture 
Corporation, the Russian Nanotechnology Corporation and  
the Russian Technologies Corporation. These public vehicles 
were created in recent years to promote innovation and 
diversification. Similarly, Kazakhstan embraced economic 
diversification as a “national idea” and created two 
development funds in 2002-03, followed by a larger one – 
Kazyna – in 2006. These aim to co-finance a wide range 
of development projects from small businesses support to 
infrastructure, with a particular focus on local content in  
the oil and gas sector, high-tech industries and agriculture.
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According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates, 
public investment as a proportion of GDP increased over the 
commodity-boom period from around 3 per cent to 4.5 per cent 
in Russia, from 3 per cent to 6 per cent in Kazakhstan,  
and from around 2 per cent to 10 per cent in Azerbaijan.  
Public spending on education increased from 2.9 per cent  
to 4 per cent of GDP in Russia and from 3.3 per cent to 
4.2 per cent in Kazakhstan, but declined in Azerbaijan  
from around 3.9 per cent in 2000 to 2.6 per cent in 2008.
Financial development
An important development of the 2000s in hydrocarbon-rich 
transition economies (with the probable exception of 
Turkmenistan) has been very rapid financial development.  
Even though nominal GDP in Russia grew eight-fold between 
1999 and 2008, bank credit to the private sector not only  
kept pace but increased from under 10 per cent of GDP in 
1999 to over 40 per cent by the end of 2008 (see Chart 4.7). 
Kazakhstan saw an even faster growth of its banking system, 
with the credit-to-GDP ratio peaking at 60 per cent in mid-
2007 compared to 7 per cent at the end of 1999. In Azerbaijan 
the stock of bank sector credit increased from 10 per cent of 
GDP in mid-2005 to 19 per cent in mid-2009, with year-on-
year growth of aggregate loan portfolio exceeding 100 per cent.
The rapid growth of bank loans was made possible through  
the abolition of capital controls, the active use of wholesale 
funding markets (particularly in the form of international 
syndicated loans) and the entry of foreign banks (except in 
Azerbaijan). As a result, the loan-to-deposit ratio in Kazakhstan 
peaked at almost 200 per cent and approached 160 per cent 
in Russia (see Chart 4.8). In Azerbaijan the ratio exceeded 
150 per cent by mid-2008, and increased to 200 per cent in 
2009 as a result of a net deposit outflow coupled with liquidity 
support to the banking system. Although the speed of financial 
deepening (relative to GDP) was generally in line with recent 
experiences of other transition countries, the loan-to-deposit 
ratios in these three resource-rich countries stayed well above 
the regional average.
Financial sector growth was assisted by a number of structural 
reforms, including the introduction and expansion of deposit 
insurance (from November 1999 in Kazakhstan, 2004 in 
Russia and 2005 in Azerbaijan), improved disclosure of 
effective interest rates to customers, and revisions to collateral 
and bankruptcy legislation. All three countries upgraded their 
frameworks for credit history bureaux and score highly on  
the World Bank’s Doing Business Credit Information Index. 
However, credit bureau coverage remains limited (estimated at 
25 per cent of the adult population in Kazakhstan, 10 per cent 
in Russia and nil in Azerbaijan). Furthermore, only in Russia did 
structural reforms in the financial sector outpace the average 
of non-oil-rich transition countries, as reflected in the EBRD’s 
financial sector transition indicators (see Chart 4.9). The lower 
score in Azerbaijan in part reflects stringent restrictions on the 
entry of foreign banks. 
Non-bank finance has also been growing, although at a slower 
pace. While stock markets in Russia experienced rapid growth 
before mid-2008, listings remained confined to a relatively 
small number of very large companies. (The Russian stock 
market had the largest average company capitalisation of all 
markets surveyed by Standard and Poor’s in 2008.) As part  
of a diversification agenda (and encouraged by the earlier 
successes of oil-rich Bahrain and Dubai), the Russian 
authorities launched an initiative in 2007-08 to develop 
Moscow into an international financial centre. Some important 
steps undertaken to date include changes in legislation that 
exempt derivatives and term contracts from restrictions on 
gambling. However, the implementation of the reform agenda 
remains in its early stages – for example, Russia has yet to 
Chart 4.9
Number of financial sector transition indicator upgrades, 
2000-08
■ Banking   ■ NBFIs   
Source: EBRD.
Note: Based on transition indicators for banking sector and non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs). 
Chart 4.7
Credit to the private sector  
■ Russia   ■ Kazakhstan   ■ Azerbaijan   ■ Other transition countries
Sources: Central banks of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia, EBRD Banking Survey  
and EBRD calculations.
Note: Monthly data for Azerbaijan not available before December 2000.
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pass a law on insider trading – and the ultimate success of the 
initiative will depend on the establishment of an effective and 
independent judiciary and on less corrupt law enforcement.
Sovereign wealth funds 
To accumulate “excess” government revenues stemming from 
oil and gas during the years of high oil prices, hydrocarbon-rich 
transition countries have established sovereign wealth funds. 
Azerbaijan set up the State Oil Fund in 1999, Kazakhstan 
followed suit with its National Fund in 2000 and Russia  
created the Stabilisation Fund in 2004 (later subdivided into 
the Reserve Fund and the National Welfare Fund in 2006 – see  
Box 4.2). Turkmenistan is in the process of setting up a similar 
fund. By the second half of 2008 these funds had accumulated 
substantial reserves. The largest of them in absolute terms 
(Russia’s) peaked at US$ 225 billion and the largest in relative 
terms (Kazakhstan’s) reached almost 30 per cent of GDP. 
Despite their rapid growth, transition countries’ sovereign 
wealth funds remain much smaller as a percentage of GDP 
than those of some other major oil exporters, such as Kuwait, 
the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) and Norway, which 
established funds years earlier (see Chart 4.10). 
Assessment
While it may be too early to assess the success of 
development policies in hydrocarbon-rich countries in 
the region, the course of the commodity price cycle can 
nonetheless provide a few early insights. 
Diversification
Measuring diversification away from oil and gas accurately is a 
challenging task, because empirical measures of production or 
export shares tend to be affected by commodity prices. Higher 
commodity prices increase the nominal value of production  
and exports of primary natural resources. They may also  
induce temporary relocation of resources towards extraction 
and related sectors. Therefore, measures of economic 
diversification in oil-rich countries tend to decrease naturally 
with increases in the oil price, even in countries perceived to 
have relatively well-diversified economies such as Malaysia and 
Mexico. For instance, as commodity prices increased between 
2000 and 2005, the share of medium- and high-value-added 
manufacturing in total exports declined in commodity exporting 
countries such as Australia, Chile and Norway (see Chart 4.11). 
To isolate commodity cycle effects as far as possible, one 
should analyse the export structures at similar points in the oil 
price cycle – that is, during periods when oil prices were almost 
identical in real terms (using the US consumer price index as a 
deflator). Such an approach is particularly useful for detecting 
signs of persistent structural changes once oil price increases 
have been reversed – since most of the resource curse 
channels involve such changes. 
By looking at production as well as merchandise exports,  
it is possible to track the degree of economic diversification. 
Exports provide more consistent data coverage and may be a 
better measure of competitiveness. This is because countries 
tend to export goods where they have comparative advantage, 
prices of exports are set in international markets and are less 
subject to distortions, and exports cannot be easily influenced 
by domestic protectionist policies. The downside of this 
approach is the potential exclusion of internationally 
competitive non-exporting industries (particularly in large 
economies such as Russia’s), as well as tradeable services 
such as finance and tourism. As a result, it is important to 
consider both export and production structures.
Box 4.2
Russia’s reserves and national wealth funds
The Russian Stabilisation Fund was established on 1 January 
2004 and took its revenue from oil export duties and 
extraction taxes when the Urals brand oil price exceeded a 
certain threshold (initially set at US$ 27 per barrel). Export 
duties are, in turn, set by the government and reviewed 
regularly, depending on oil price movements. The Fund was 
set up to finance budget deficits when the oil price fell below 
that same threshold. The Fund could also be used for other 
purposes, provided that its total assets exceeded 500 billion 
roubles (US$ 17 billion at the time). When this target was first 
surpassed in 2005, some of the savings were used to prepay 
federal external debt and finance the deficit of the State 
Pension Fund. The Stabilisation Fund is managed by the 
Ministry of Finance and is invested in highly rated securities 
issued by foreign governments. Fund accounts are  
published monthly.
Then in 2006 the Fund’s framework underwent reform. Sources 
of revenue were augmented to include gas export duties (in 
addition to oil export duties) and the Fund was subdivided into 
the Reserve Fund and the National Welfare Fund. The former is 
capped at 10 per cent of forecast GDP, to be invested into 
highly rated liquid securities issued by foreign governments or 
international organisations. Its assets can be used to prepay 
federal debt or finance spending if oil and gas revenues fall 
short of a target predefined in the budget.
 
 
 
When the Reserve Fund reaches 10 per cent of GDP, oil and 
gas revenues in excess of the target are channelled to the 
National Welfare Fund, whose investment criteria for the latter 
are similar to those of the Reserve Fund, except that part of 
the National Welfare Fund assets can be invested in equity 
and bonds of domestic and foreign enterprises or placed with 
the state development bank, Vnesheconombank (including in 
rouble-denominated deposits, up to a certain limit). The uses 
of the National Welfare Fund are exclusively to co-finance 
voluntary pension contributions and finance State Pension 
Fund deficits, complementing or replacing federal budget 
transfers to the Pension Fund. 
Overall, this framework has proved to be useful for 
accumulating fiscal reserves during the commodity boom and 
aiding macroeconomic management. It could also serve as  
a commitment device to ring-fence resource revenues and 
redistribute them broadly. That said, current rules leave room 
for substantial discretion regarding the proportion of oil rents 
deposited to the sovereign wealth funds and how they can  
be spent. The current commodity boom-bust cycle – the first 
since the establishment of the Stabilisation Fund – will be  
an important test of the strength and resilience of the Fund’s 
institutional framework.
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Chart 4.12a shows the structure of Russian merchandise 
exports in December 2004 to April 2005, when Urals brand oil 
price averaged US$ 42 per barrel (US$ 46 in 2008 prices), and 
in December 2008 to April 2009, when the oil price returned  
to the level of early 2005, averaging US$ 43 per barrel. For 
comparison, the period December 2007 to April 2008 is also 
shown (during which time Urals oil averaged US$ 95 a barrel). 
Chart 4.12b shows GDP structures based on national accounts 
for the first quarters of 2005, 2008 and 2009, respectively. 
Overall, headline figures suggesting an increase in Russia’s 
dependence on oil and gas revenues in recent years appear  
to largely reflect higher oil prices. The share of crude oil  
and gas in total merchandise exports in 2009 fell back to 
approximately the levels of early 2005 as price increases  
of previous years were undone. In fact, the demand for  
higher-value-added manufacturing exports seems to have 
held up slightly better during the global economic crisis  
than the demand for fuel exports, particularly gas.
However, the share of manufacturing and agriculture in  
total output continued to shrink, mirrored by expansion of  
non-tradeables (services and construction). These data may 
partly reflect the temporary impact of the economic crisis, 
which induced contracting trade volumes and industrial 
production across the world (which may explain the observed 
drop in the share of extraction industries in the total value 
added in the first quarter of 2009). Nonetheless, the 
breakdowns of GDP and exports at comparable points in  
the oil price cycle suggest that the Russian economy has  
not made significant progress in diversification towards  
non-resource tradeable sectors in recent years. 
Chart 4.10
Sovereign wealth fund assets  
■ Transition countries   ■ Selected countries
Sources: Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) Institute and IMF.
Note: Data for 2008 or latest estimate available. 
Chart 4.12a
Russia: Structure of merchandise exports  
Chart 4.12b
Russia: Structure of GDP  
Chart 4.11
Share of higher-value-added manufacturing in exports 
■ 2000   ■ 2005   
Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).
Note: Selected countries.
■ Higher-value-added manufacturing   ■ Other   ■ Crude oil and gas
Sources: Rosstat and EBRD calculations.
Note: Higher-value-added manufacturing goods include machinery, equipment and vehicles. 
Other goods include refined oil and petrochemicals. 
■ Agriculture   ■ Manufacturing   ■ Other   ■ Extraction
Sources: Rosstat and EBRD calculations.
Note: Based on quarterly data. Excluding net taxes. Agriculture includes fishing. “Other” includes 
services and construction. 
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Chart 4.14
Commodity dependence and crisis impact
4.14a Broad sample of countries 4.14b Transition countries
Chart 4.13
Structure of merchandise exports 
4.13a Azerbaijan
4.13c Russia
4.13b Kazakhstan
4.13d Other transition countries
■ Higher-tech manufacturing   ■ Other manufacturing   ■ Agriculture   ■ Mining and fuels
Sources: WTO and authors’ calculations. 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on export-weighted average of Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine. Comparable points: 1996  
(oil at US$ 28 in 2008 prices) and 2002 (oil at US$ 30 in 2008 prices).
■ Fitted line   ■ Selected countries
Sources: WTO, IMF and authors’ calculations.
Note: Based on World Economic Outlook April 2009 forecasts, 129 countries.
Sources: WTO, EBRD and authors’ calculations.
Note: Based on May 2009 EBRD forecasts. Data for Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan  
are not available.
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Chart 4.13 shows the evolution of the structure of merchandise 
exports over a longer period for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia 
and other transition countries, highlighting points in time  
when oil prices were comparable in real terms. In Russia the 
structure of exports was similar at corresponding points in the 
oil price cycle, but Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan saw a gradual 
yet sustained decline in the export shares of agricultural 
produce and manufacturing (both in the lower-value-added 
and higher-value-added segments). Growing dependence on 
oil and gas exports over time partly reflects the successful 
development of new oil and gas fields based on production 
sharing agreements with international oil companies. However, 
it also suggests very limited progress, if any, in diversification 
efforts to date. 
Macroeconomic policies
A steep drop in commodity prices in late 2008 was one of  
the key channels of transmission of the global economic and 
financial crisis, alongside a sharp reduction in financial flows 
and a fall in demand for manufactured goods and tradeable 
services. However, it is not obvious whether commodity 
exporters have been hit harder than other countries, as world 
prices for investment goods may have decreased more steeply 
than, for example, oil prices. The analysis in Chapter 2 of 
factors explaining cross-country differences in output declines 
in the transition region did not point to commodity dependence 
as a significant determinant. 
Indeed, if anything, commodity-rich countries seem to have 
been affected less severely than other countries. Chart 4.14 
shows the relationship between the share of natural resources 
in countries’ total exports and the deviation of the 2009 output 
growth forecast from the 1999-2008 average. (The forecasts 
are from the April 2009 IMF World Economic Outlook for a 
broad sample of countries and from the May 2009 EBRD press 
release for a subsample of the Bank’s countries of operations.) 
The correlation is positive but weak. When differences in other 
key indicators, such as per capita GDP, are taken into account, 
commodity resources appear as a significant mitigating factor 
of the output decline in the broad sample. 
The lack of a negative relationship may be due to the fact that 
other countries, including those specialising in manufacturing, 
have been severely affected by capital flow reversals and lower 
global demand. Importantly, however, a number of commodity 
exporters have been able to soften the impact of the downturn 
by using accumulated sovereign reserves to deploy forceful 
fiscal and monetary stimuli. 
Indeed, fiscal and foreign currency reserves accumulated by 
major oil and gas producers have substantially widened the 
policy options available during the downturn. International 
reserves helped Azerbaijan to defend its currency and  
Russia and Kazakhstan to manage orderly currency 
depreciations in the face of lower oil receipts and capital 
outflows, while preserving financial stability through the 
provision of large-scale liquidity support to the banking system. 
In all three countries, governments drew on the reserves of 
sovereign wealth funds to provide a fiscal stimulus, boosting 
social transfers, targeting particular industries and earmarking 
funds for the recapitalisation of banks. While the targeting  
of some of these expenditures is debatable, the presence  
of sovereign wealth funds clearly expanded the ability of  
these governments to pursue countercyclical policy.
Financial development
Earlier analysis has emphasised the potential benefits of 
financial development in reducing macroeconomic volatility  
and alleviating credit constraints of companies operating in  
the agribusiness and non-oil-related manufacturing sectors 
(which tend to be particularly dependent on external finance). 
At the same time, however, financial flows in hydrocarbon-
dependent economies tend to be closely correlated with oil 
price movements. Financial development can therefore also 
exacerbate the commodity price cycles and increase leverage – 
and vulnerabilities – in the banking system. Moreover,  
credit-fuelled consumption booms may shift demand and 
production structure further towards services, so magnifying 
the Dutch Disease symptoms. Perhaps unsurprisingly, empirical 
evidence on the role of financial development in resource-rich 
countries worldwide has been scarce and inconclusive.23 
It appears that both effects have been at play in the oil-rich 
transition countries. Financial deepening supported enterprise 
growth across various sectors of the economy but a significant 
proportion of credit was channelled to trade, other services, 
residential construction and personal consumption. In 
Kazakhstan consumer credit grew at explosive rates of up to 
150 per cent a year and peaked at over 21 per cent of GDP.  
In Russia household credit growth has been more modest but 
total consumer credit nonetheless increased from 0.5 per cent 
of GDP in 1999 to 10 per cent in 2008, and many real estate 
developers and construction firms opted for very high levels of 
leverage. In Azerbaijan almost 40 per cent of outstanding credit 
by mid-2008 comprised lending to consumers.
In addition, high loan-to-deposit ratios have made banks more 
vulnerable to reversals of financial flows. While the negative 
impact of the global crisis on economic growth in countries 
with deeper financial systems appears to be less severe,  
it has been more pronounced in countries with higher  
loan-to-deposit ratios (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, credit 
growth rates of over 50 per cent per year have strained  
banks’ risk management systems. Similarly, regulation and 
supervision, while substantially improved in recent years, have 
not always kept pace with a rapid growth of financial assets. 
The sharp economic downturn has highlighted the need to 
strengthen the standards of asset quality disclosure by banks 
(see Chapter 3).
Institutions
As discussed in Chapter 5 of the 2008 Transition Report, 
diversification policies are difficult to get right in practice and 
their success largely depends on the quality of institutions. 
This claim is consistent with the results of a cross-country 
study of diversification experiences, which show that the 
quality of institutions is a powerful predictor of shifts towards 
export structures based on higher-value-added manufacturing 
and food exports (see Box 4.3 on page 88). Oil rents are 
negatively associated with diversification outcomes but this 
association disappears when the quality of institutions  
is controlled for, suggesting that oil rents influence 
diversification outcomes primarily through their impact  
on the institutional environment.
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This leads to the question of how institutions have been 
affected by natural resource abundance and whether the  
oil-rich countries in the region have succeeded in improving 
the quality of institutions. Chart 4.15 plots the evolution of 
World Bank Governance Indicators since 1996 (when the first 
set of indicators was published) for hydrocarbon-rich transition 
countries, as well as for a simple average of other transition 
countries. The overall index takes into account the rule of law, 
voter accountability, effectiveness of government, regulatory 
quality, control of corruption, political stability and the absence 
of violence. 
From the start, the perceived quality of institutions in the 
hydrocarbon-rich countries was substantially below the 
transition country average. Furthermore, while the transition 
average has been steadily improving over time, the perceived 
quality of institutions in most oil-rich countries “peaked” in 
1998-2000, at the bottom of the oil price cycle, and declined 
as oil prices started recovering. For Kazakhstan, even though 
in recent years this perceived quality improved and exceeded 
the peak of 1998, the gap in relation to the non-oil-rich 
transition country average remained greater than in 1996.  
For all hydrocarbon-rich countries the gap widened more 
significantly for the indicators tracking rule of law and voice 
and accountability, while the effectiveness of government  
is perceived to have improved. 
Box 4.3
Diversification and institutions: cross-country evidence
Examining export structures during periods when oil prices 
were comparable in real terms is useful when considering  
the long-term outcomes of diversification. The analysis 
below compares average export structures of 96 countries 
(where data are available) in 1991-92, when oil averaged 
US$ 30.3 per barrel in 2008 prices (adjusted using US 
consumer price index), and in 2001-03, when oil averaged 
US$ 31 per barrel in 2008 prices. The dependent variable, 
interpreted as a measure of diversification away from 
commodities, is the share of higher-value-added 
manufacturing (transport, machinery, equipment,  
electronics) and food in merchandise exports, as  
reported by the World Trade Organization. 
These export items are technologically distanced from 
commodities – unlike, for example, petrochemicals or  
semi-finished steel. Furthermore, they constitute the bulk of 
advanced countries’ exports (around 70 per cent in the case of 
Germany and Japan, 60 per cent in the case of France and the 
United States, around half for Canada and the United Kingdom 
and around 30 per cent for Australia – compared with less than 
10 per cent in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia).
Table 4.3.1 shows the results of simple regressions of export 
structure in 2001-03 on the structure in 1991-92 and a 
number of controls. They indicate that export structures 
change slowly – structures in 1991-92 explain almost 
three-quarters of the variation in structures in 2001-03. 
Higher oil rents (as a share of GDP) at the start of the period 
are associated with a decline in the share of higher-value-
added manufacturing and food exports, and this effect 
 
 
 
appears to be statistically and economically significant, 
controlling for the initial level of income at purchasing  
power parity prices (see column A). 
However, when a measure of the quality of institution  
is included, oil rents lose their significance (and the 
corresponding coefficient even becomes positive, although 
very small – see column B).24 The estimates suggest that 
a one-standard deviation improvement in the quality of 
institutions is associated with a 4-6 percentage point 
increase in the share of higher-value-added manufacturing 
and food in merchandise exports. Column D shows that this 
relationship is even stronger in a subsample of countries with 
weaker institutions (with values below the sample median). It 
also holds in a subsample of 25 countries where commodities 
accounted for over 40 per cent of merchandise exports at the 
start of the period (see column E).
The coefficient on financial development (measured by the 
average private sector credit-to-GDP ratio – columns C and 
D) is positive but small and statistically insignificant. This is 
consistent with the view that financial deepening in itself may, 
but need not always, be supportive of export sophistication 
and diversification, and its impact ultimately depends on the 
structural characteristics of credit and the financial system. 
The presence of a sovereign wealth fund did not seem to be 
associated with positive diversification outcomes in oil-rich 
countries: the coefficient on the interaction term between  
oil rents and the dummy variable indicating existence of the 
sovereign wealth fund at the start of the period is small  
and statistically insignificant. 
Table 4.3.1
Determinants of export structure
Model A B C D E
Method OLS
Dependent variable Share of higher-value-added manufacturing and food in exports, 2001–03
Exports structure in 1991–92 0.784 (0.061)*** 0.806 (0.059)*** 0.803 (0.058)*** 0.815 (0.073)*** 0.756 (0.067)***
GDP per capita, log, PPP 1.779 (0.935)* –2.874 (1.769) –2.472 (1.818) –3.664 (2.057) –5.608 (2.094)**
Oil rents (in per cent of GDP) –0.230 (0.114)** 0.013 (0.127) –0.051 (0.150) 0.027 (0.151) 0.159 (0.144)
Oil rents* SWF dummy – – –0.045 (0.103) – –
Quality of institutions, index – 1.222 (0.549)** 1.074 (0.620)* 3.779 (0.943)*** 1.130 (0.484)**
Private sector credit-to-GDP (period 
average) – – 0.009 (0.041) 0.012 (0.093) –
Constant –5.487 (7.724) 30.282 (14.615)** 26.709 (14.824)* 39.716 (16.101)** 51.026 (18.151)**
R2 0.72 0.75 0.76 0.79 0.79
Number of observations 96 89 86 43 25
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Values significant at the 10 per cent level are marked with *; at the 5 per cent level, with **; at the 1 per cent level, with ***. In column D only countries with
the value of index of institutions below the median are included. In column E only countries where commodities accounted for more than 40 per cent of merchandise exports at the start of the period are included.
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Chart 4.15
World Bank Governance Indicators 1996-2008
4.15a Overall 4.15b Rule of law
■ Azerbaijan   ■ Kazakhstan   ■ Russia   ■ Turkmenistan   ■ Other transition countries (average)
Sources: World Bank and Kaufmann et al (2009). 
Note: Higher values correspond to better institutions.
4.15c Voice and accountability 4.15d Government effectiveness
4.15e Control of corruption 4.15f Quality of regulation
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Conclusion
Commodity resources create huge opportunities for financing 
investment, education and, ultimately, growth. At the same 
time, there are channels through which they can depress a 
country’s long-term growth potential. Unstable resource prices 
can generate macroeconomic volatility which discourages 
investment, especially in countries with underdeveloped 
financial institutions. Shifts in physical and human capital 
investment away from non-resource sectors during commodity 
booms are hard to reverse once those booms subside.  
Most importantly, high resource rents provide incentives for 
powerful elites to engage in rent-seeking rather than building 
growth-promoting institutions.
To address these challenges, resource-rich economies 
can pursue diversification through a variety of strategies:  
direct investment in non-resource sectors; investments in 
infrastructure and education that benefit all sectors; fiscal 
redistribution to spread resource wealth more widely and fairly; 
and financial sector development to effectively intermediate 
commodity-related and other financial inflows throughout the 
economy. In addition, they can build institutions such as 
sovereign wealth funds that save a portion of high hydrocarbon 
revenues in order to reduce macroeconomic volatility, protect 
resource rents and make their use more transparent.
The post-communist oil-rich countries have done fairly well in 
terms of prudent macroeconomic policies and financial sector 
development. Reserves accumulated during the boom helped 
maintain financial stability when commodity prices collapsed 
and the financial crisis hit in the second half of 2008, and 
have since been underpinning stimulus packages in crisis-hit 
economies. Also, while booms in financial services fuelled by 
external borrowing have amplified the effects of the commodity 
cycle and generated vulnerabilities in the banking system 
(particularly in Kazakhstan), greater financial sophistication  
is playing an important role in supporting the real sector, 
including agribusiness and non-oil manufacturing. In addition, 
public investment as a share of GDP has increased significantly 
in the oil-rich countries and for the most part so has spending 
on education. 
However, these policies have not so far been successful in 
achieving diversification. A comparison of export and output 
structure over time shows a decline in non-oil export shares 
in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, a roughly constant share in 
Russia, and a decline in manufacturing as a share of Russian 
GDP. This is not entirely surprising in the light of international 
evidence suggesting that the success of diversification policies 
in resource-rich countries depends critically on the quality of 
institutions. According to standard measures, the resource-rich 
post-communist countries entered the resource boom with 
weaker institutions than many other transition economies;  
and, unlike in other transition economies, institutions in 
resource-rich countries do not seem to have improved 
significantly over time.
This points to a conundrum. Institutions are important for 
successful diversification but, at the same time, resource 
wealth and lack of diversification are an obstacle to improving 
institutions. How can oil-rich economies break free from what 
appears to be a “weak institutions trap”? The analysis in this 
chapter suggests that doing so is difficult but also identifies 
some “escape routes”. Diversification policies, broadly  
defined, include not just industrial policies but also financial 
development and countercyclical macroeconomic policies.  
The latter have been broadly successful in oil-rich transition 
countries but may not have gone far enough (or been in place 
for long enough) to have an impact on the production structure. 
Financial development, in particular, has a long way to go. 
Finally, the experience with sovereign wealth funds 
demonstrates that even in environments with strong incentives 
for rent-seeking, it is possible to create new institutions 
that protect these rents and channel them towards more 
transparent uses. While rent-seeking is a powerful obstacle 
to better institutions, it is not the only incentive that matters. 
For example, as large business groups in Russia seek to 
attract international capital, they are becoming more interested 
in improving their corporate governance. Growing middle 
classes and global economic competition among large 
emerging markets may also trigger institutional reform. 
Meanwhile, pressure for improvement may come from exterior 
sources (see also Box 4.4). These include, for example: the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (which classifies 
Azerbaijan as the only compliant transition country, and 
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Mongolia – but not  
Russia – as candidates); and anti-corruption legislation in 
home countries of foreign firms, which has been shown  
to affect their behaviour in the FDI-recipient countries.25 
Institution building in resource-rich countries is likely to 
be difficult and protracted, but by no means hopeless.
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Box 4.4
How Mongolia is fighting the resource curse
With mining accounting for roughly 25 per cent of GDP and 
70 per cent of total exports, Mongolia fits well into the group 
of resource-rich transition countries studied in this chapter. 
However, three features set it aside. First, it is much poorer 
and smaller, with per capita GDP at about 20 per cent of 
Russia’s, 30 per cent of Kazakhstan’s and 60 per cent of 
Turkmenistan’s. Second, its political institutions are ranked 
much higher, in line with advanced democracies. Third, it is  
at an earlier stage of resource sector development, with a 
number of multi-billion investment projects under preparation, 
whose total exploration and investment costs are expected  
to exceed 200 per cent of 2008 GDP and lead to annual 
revenue of about 100 per cent of 2008 GDP after they start 
production. Hence, Mongolia’s current resource streams are  
a small fraction of what is expected in the future.
Together, these features create extraordinary challenges  
and opportunities. This box focuses on two. First, how can  
a small country that depends on foreign capital develop its 
resource sector in a way that makes it both attractive to 
foreign investment and allows it to keep most of its resource 
rents? Second, is there an opportunity to forestall the 
“resource curse” before the full brunt of revenue income 
materialises (particularly when political institutions are good)? 
In the 1990s Mongolia’s resource regime was highly 
favourable to foreign investors, with licences often granted  
on a first-come, first-served basis and tax and royalty rates 
low by international standards. As a number of mining  
projects were successfully implemented and commodity  
prices rose sharply, the government – and public opinion – 
became increasingly concerned with capturing a larger share 
of resource rents. In 2006 the government introduced a 
68 per cent surtax on corporate revenues once commodity 
prices exceeded pre-set thresholds, and announced 
its intention to obtain majority control over strategic  
mining assets (or at least 34 per cent if mines were  
developed privately).26 
While Mongolia was not very different from other developing 
country resource exporters in this respect (particularly in  
Latin America, where several countries introduced similar 
windfall taxes at about the same time, or even nationalised 
their mining industries),27 these decisions had costly 
repercussions. Mongolia’s attractiveness for minerals 
exploration, as published by the Fraser Institute, dropped 
from 3rd place out of 64 countries in 2005/06 to 57th out  
of 71 countries in 2008/09. Non-transparent gold sales have 
substantially increased in recent years. Most importantly,  
negotiations between the government and foreign mining 
 
 
 
companies relating to the large Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold 
mining project have been delayed. A number of foreign 
investors perceived policy uncertainty to be excessive  
and decided to leave the country. The Mongolian example 
therefore raises the question of whether it is possible  
to write international resource contracts that are more  
robust to large commodity price changes – a question  
that has attracted much recent interest.28 
The second challenge is whether a country can forestall a 
resource curse by taking appropriate action before resource 
rents start arriving (or while they are comparatively modest). 
Based on the economic models surveyed in the chapter,  
there is reason to be sceptical: it is expectations of future 
rents, together with pre-existing institutional constraints, 
that determine institutional development. With regard to  
pre-existing institutions, Mongolia is something of a mix 
(see Table 4.4.1). On the one hand it has a multi-party 
democracy, a free press and a vibrant network of  
non-governmental organisations, but on the other hand it 
tends to score worse than the transition economy average 
(but better than the average of resource-rich transition 
economies) on rule of law, regulatory quality and corruption 
perceptions. So Mongolia could be a test case on whether 
good political institutions can eventually lead to improvements 
in economic institutions, even in the presence of resource 
wealth, or whether the resource curse will begin to undermine 
political institutions as well.
One channel through which Mongolia is attempting to forestall 
the resource curse is by using the international community  
as a commitment device. In 2007 Mongolia agreed with  
the Asian Development Bank, the EBRD and World Bank  
to establish a platform for sustainable mining sector 
development. The government joined the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) and developed a set of fiscal 
rules for the use of proceeds of the Development Fund –  
a ring-fenced fund generated by the windfall profit tax. 
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) have financed a 
number of mining sector projects, in which companies were 
required to meet EITI accounting and publication standards, 
and undertake environmental and social action plans and 
public consultations in the project regions. More recently,  
the government has established a modern PPP framework  
to develop infrastructure for mining sector development, 
supported by MDBs. It remains to be seen whether the 
potential discipline that these initiatives provide can help 
offset incentives for rent-seeking and contribute to the 
improvement of economic institutions more broadly.
Table 4.4.1
Mongolia and comparator countries: resources, per capita income and institutions 
Resource exports  
(per cent of GDP)
PPP GDP per capita 
(US$)
Democracy  
(-10 to 10)
Rule of law  
(-2.5 to +2.5)
Regulatory quality 
(-2.5 to +2.5)
Corruption  
perceptions index  
(0 to 10)
Mongolia 70.0 3,541 10.0 -0.5 -0.3 3.0
Resource-rich transition countries1 76.0 8,770 -2.8 -1.0 -0.7 2.0
All transition countries 28.5 11,937 4.9 -0.3 0.1 3.6
Non-transition OECD countries 18.5 37,398 9.1 1.5 1.4 7.6
Sources: WTO; IMF World Economic Outlook (PPP GDP per capita); Polity IV database (Democracy); World Bank World Governance Indicators (Rule of law, Regulatory quality); Transparency International  
(Corruption perceptions index, with 10 meaning the least corrupt). 
Note: Data are based on the latest available (2007 or 2008). 1 Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Russia and Turkmenistan. Resource export averages exclude Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
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Endnotes
1 The term was first coined by Auty (1993).
2 See Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989).
3 See Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere and Rogoff (2006) for empirical evidence on this point.
4 See Gylfason (2001), Stijns (2006) and Suslova and Volchkova (2007).
5  The term was coined by The Economist magazine to refer to the Netherlands’ experience following the 
discovery of hydrocarbons in the North Sea in 1959.
6 See, for example, Corden and Neary (1982).
7  There is evidence that the “sophistication” of export products predicts higher future growth.  
See Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007) and EBRD, Transition Report (2008), Chapter 4.
8 See Krugman (1987).
9 See Tornell and Lane (1999) and Sonin (2003).
10  This relationship is still under-researched compared to other dimensions of the resource curse. 
As correctly argued by Ross (2007), the quality of data on inequality is relatively low in general and is 
especially low in resource-rich countries. 
11  See Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004). The concept of the 
“median voter” refers to a representative individual whose vote on a certain issue (for example 
redistribution) will be deciding, giving a candidate or proposal a majority of 50 per cent plus one. If each 
voter had a preferred degree of redistribution in society and these preferences were ranked, the winning 
proposal would be the degree of redistribution at the median of the distribution of preferences. 
12  See Sachs and Warner (1997a,b; 2001), Auty (1993, 2001) and Gylfason,  
Herbertsson and Zoega (1999).
13  See Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006).
14 See Hutchison (1994), Volchkova (2005) and Ahrend, de Rosa and Tompson (2007).
15  See Guriev, Kolotilin and Sonin (2009), Blanchard et al (1994), Durnev and Guriev (2007), Egorov, 
Guriev and Sonin (2009), Ross (2001) and Amin and Djankov (2009), respectively. See also Esanov, 
Raiser and Buiter (2001) for early evidence of the adverse impact of oil revenues on reform progress  
in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
16 See Ross (2006).
17  Chiefly, difficulties in establishing causality in light of possible reverse causality and omitted variables  
in the regression. In a cross-section of countries, it is impossible to control for all the factors that may 
influence growth; and there may be feedback effects from growth to its supposed determinants. 
18 See Hotelling (1931).
19  Based on the standard Hotelling analysis, Heal (2007) arrives at the opposite result. However, this 
analysis does not account for the market power of the major oil producers or for the risk of arrival of 
alternative technologies in the foreseeable future.
20  Note that taxation of resource exports cannot play a significant role in redirecting investment towards 
the non-resource sectors. In an open economy, when the government increases taxes (that is, decreases 
returns on investment) in one sector, capital will flow to other countries, with negligible impact on 
domestic investment.
21 See Rajan and Zingales (1998).
22 See also Hausmann and Klinger (2007) and Hidalgo et al (2007).
23 See Nili and Rastad (2007), Chapter 3 of this report, and Berglof and Lehmann (2009). 
24  The quality of institutions is measured by the World Bank’s Governance Index, which takes into account 
voter accountability, political stability, effectiveness of government, quality of regulations, rule of law 
and control of corruption. The first available observation is for 1996.
25 See Javorcik and Wei (2009).
26 A repeal of the windfall tax was announced in August 2009. 
27  See Box 5 in IMF (2006). On the topic of natural resources populism,  
see Hogan and Sturzenegger (2009). 
28 See Aghion and Quesada (2009).
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